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Data sharing is an essential element of research, however recent scientific and social developments have challenged conventional methods for protecting privacy. Here we provide guidance for determining data sharing thresholds for human pluripotent stem cell research aimed at a wide range of stakeholders, including research consortia, biorepositories, policy-makers and funders.


The discovery of technologies to generate induced pluripotent stem cell lines (iPSC), and the corresponding derivation of large numbers of these lines for research and potential therapeutic use have resulted in a rejuvenated interest in biorepositories (McKernan &Watt, 2013; Stacey et. al, 2013). Biorepositories are vital infrastructures providing primary material (primary samples, cell lines, and associated data) for research and clinical translation. Today, biorepositories serve also as the primary resource for authenticated, quality-controlled and ethically sourced human pluripotent stem cell (hPSC) lines.  Robust banking networks now enable global access to well-characterized and traceable hPSCs, an essential pre-requisite for scientific reproducibility (Stacey et. al, 2013). The availability of such resources presents a wide range of therapeutic opportunities, however, sharing them also comes with an attendant responsibility to protect donors’ or research participants (hereinafter “participants”) privacy.  

 These competing factors require striking a delicate balance between the amount and quality of data collected and the precautions taken when sharing  such information. Comprehensive data curation is important because cell-line misidentification continues to be a pervasive problem, undermining the scope and authenticity of research findings. In addition, well-annotated genomic, epigenomic, and participants’ participants’ phenotypic and demographic data facilitates disease modeling and drug development, and contributes to the understanding of genetic variation and its role in normal cell behavior. Next generation sequencing (NGS) technologies combined with bioinformatic data systems enable data analysis on a wide range of participants  facilitating the translation of cell based-therapies (Kreiner & Irion, 2013; McKernan &Watt, 2013). 

In this Forum, we discuss the challenges of establishing thresholds for sharing and publishing individual/ summary data associated with hPSC research. We review the ensuing scientific, socio-ethical and legal implications and propose a framework with criteria for data sharing policies. Our recommendations are directed at a wide range of stakeholders.


Data Sharing, Privacy and Re-identifiability

Fundamental scientific data can be perceived as a community resource. Data sharing constitutes an ethical and scientific imperative that is recognized by international funders and scientific organizations across disciplines and jurisdictions (Knoppers, 2010; Kaye, 2012).  This imperative is underpinned by the principles of reciprocity, solidarity, and respect for all stakeholders. Data sharing is envisaged as a tripartite responsibility of data producers, users, and funders (Isasi et. al., 2012; International Stem Cell Forum, 2011). Scientific integrity and progress are dependent not only on the sharing of raw data between researchers, but also on the ability to widely disseminate research findings. In turn, public trust is earned and maintained by responsible stewardship. The latter entails protecting - and possibly also promoting - the interests of participants’ while advancing societal benefits.  Moreover, trust requires respecting divergent interests by balancing benefits and risks in a proportionate and appropriate manner (Rodriguez et.al, 2013).

Several scientific and social developments are prompting reconsideration of how the imperative of data sharing is conceptualized and implemented. The decreasing costs and increasing accessibility of NGS and cloud computing, along with the growing volume, richness and complexity of genomic information available, are challenging individual privacy and the traditional methods designed to manage and secure such data (e.g. coding and anonymization). These factors, together with reports of the ease of re-identification in the scientific literature and popular press, contribute to changing public attitudes on the meaning of individual privacy and attendant expectations about the fiduciary duties of data stewards (Kaye, 2012; Rodriguez et. al., 2013). 

Empirical studies to assess participants’ data sharing decisions and attitudes demonstrate that regarding clinical and genetics research, participants are overall “health informational altruists”. Such studies are reassuring because they suggest that an inability to guarantee privacy may not deter individuals from participating in research (Rodriguez et. al., 2013). However, there is also need to consider mitigating actions to ensure participants trust in science. For example, participants often wish to be involved in decision-making and have concerns about governance mechanisms safeguarding privacy.  In addition, these studies show that participants’ privacy-utility trade-off decisions vary in real versus hypothetical scenarios (Kaye, 2012).   With hPSC research specifically, there is emerging evidence that participants broadly support data sharing even while maintaining privacy concerns. Further research is needed to systematically assess participants’ views (Dasgupta et. al., 2014).

We are at a crucial juncture where novel statistical methods and associated tools allow the drawing of inferences, possibly revealing the identity of individual participants in biomedical research. Genomic information is both intrinsically self-identifying and a source of familial information.   A recent study demonstrated that re-identification is possible even in the absence of a reference sample (Gymrek et. al., 2013). Several genomic studies also demonstrated a wide range of scenarios in which re-identifying participants in biomedical research could be possible by triangulating multiple publicly available data sources (e.g. census, and genealogy data, obituaries, voter registries, etc). It has been established that relying on as few as 75 individual (statistically independent) SNP loci could enable unique individual identifiability (Gymrek et. al., 2013; Rodriguez et. al., 2013). 
 
Re-identification, is the ability of protected data to be traced back to a participant.  It can occur directly or indirectly, deliberately or unintentionally and by different means: (i) directly by matching genomic data against a reference genotype, (ii) by deduction or by linking to non-genetic databases (e.g. health care, forensic, administrative, genealogical, etc.) and matching it to genotype and other associated data (e.g. gender, age, disease status) and (iii), by inference, profiling genomic data from DNA analysis (e.g. gender, blood type, etc). Consequently, individual identifiability is currently present at incremental levels from overtly identifiable to potentially identifiable (Rodriguez et. al., 2013; Gymrek et. al., 2013; Kaye, 2012). 

While the generalizability of the above mentioned methods and tools continues to be evaluated, and evidence-based risk re-assessments debated, it is clear that the concepts of identifiability and privacy are shifting, as are the expectations of stakeholders.  For a proportional and realistic risk assessment, due consideration should be given not only to the existence of multiple data resources, potential data users, and malicious intruders; but also to different data environments as a whole, which extend well beyond the research context.  Privacy risk assessments should also be situated in a society in which social media and direct-to-consumer genetic testing are omnipresent (Knoppers, 2010). In this manner, individuals are broadly and openly sharing their personal information, genomic or otherwise, as well as their family members’ information, either directly or by association.  These factors increase the likelihood of participant re-identification by expanding the range of data resources publicly available that can be used in combination with other data sources to re-identify individuals.  They further create vulnerabilities in governance mechanisms, decreasing the effectiveness of data security measures, challenging the protections for privacy and confidentiality, and thereby providing an opportunity for participant re-identification (Gymrek et. al., 2013; Rodriguez et. al., 2013). For these reasons, relying solely on traditional methods based on informed consent and data coding or  anonymization (irreversibly stripping of identifiers) are naïve and insufficient to protect participants’ privacy (Kaye, 2012).  More sophisticated security measures, in combination with sanctions for deliberate breaches of confidentiality, are required to keep pace with technological developments (International Stem Cell Forum, 2011).
A pivotal concern regarding identifiability is the potential for personal and  health information to be associated with a specific individual,  and the possible harms of discrimination (e.g. employment, insurance) stigmatization, stress, anxiety, etc (Kaye, 2012). These harms need not be confined to the individual but could also be extended to a community or sub-population to which the participant belongs (based on disease condition, ethnicity, familial relations, etc). Needless to say, unintended or deliberate misuse and disclosure of personal information due to participant re-identifiability, breaches the trust established between researchers and participants. Therefore, risks and harms are not restricted solely to participants but are also present for data stewards, researchers and the entire scientific enterprise (Rodriguez et. al., 2013; International Stem Cell Forum, 2011).







Scientific Considerations for hPSC Line Derivation

Given that an hESC line bears the contribution of two genetically different individuals, genetic/ genotype data arising from hESC line itself is unique to the embryo/cell line and not directly attributable to any individual donor. For this reason, the possibility of donor re-identification based solely upon the genotype of a hESC line remains extremely remote. However, while hESC associated data would not correspond directly to the genotype of the individual donor(s), the information that can be gleaned using diverse molecular analyses could have medical and social significance for the donors and related individuals. Moreover, in some cases the interpretations of certain genetic data derived from numerous loci (e.g. ethnicity), combined with the laboratory of origin or partial genotype information for a putative donor(s) could be sufficient for the donors to identify themselves or be identified by others by triangulation with public information (International Stem Cell Forum, 2011; Isasi et. al., 2012). 

In contrast to hESC lines, iPSCs contain donor-specific DNA. While the gene insertion and reprogramming process results in minor changes to the DNA (e.g. changes in methylation patterns, etc.) the genetic/genomic data arising in this context remains virtually identical to that of the donor.Consideration should be given to circumstances in which the potential for re-identifiability is exacerbated, as, for example, in the context of donors affected by rare disorders, due to the small population size, uniqueness of their genotype, or media publicity, which could allow the discovery of personal data linked to the genetic information (Isasi et. al., 2012) .

Towards a Policy Framework

For scientists, research consortia, biorepositories as well as funding bodies, we envisage a system for data sharing grounded on the principles of good governance that ensures a fair balance between individual interests and public benefits.  Such a system should rely on establishing different thresholds for data sharing to minimize the chances of triangulation of a particular data set with other data sets that could further facilitate the re-identification of a participant (Kaye, 2012).  These thresholds should be situated along a continuum between overtly identifiable to potentially identifiable data/samples (Rodriguez et. al., 2013). They should be subject to ongoing re-assessment to reflect the pace of scientific discoveries, to consider changing public attitudes as well as to determine contemporaneous concerns of participants with regards to the meaning of individual privacy and attendant expectations regarding the scope of the fiduciary duties of data/sample custodians. 

Moreover, the goal of open science and the principles of transparency, autonomy, and beneficence argue in favor of a system of broad informed consent to sharing genotypic and phenotypic data of hPSC lines, subject to appropriate governance (International Stem Cell Forum, 2011; Isasi et. al., 2012). A robust consent process entails empowering participants to make their own risks-benefits assessment before participation. It also requires improving genetic literacy (Knoppers, 2010; Kaye, 2012; Rodriguez et. al., 2013). To that end, the consent process should explicitly address data-sharing scenarios and their implications for the protection of participant’s privacy and confidentiality. It should further disclose the reasonably foreseeable likelihood of re-identification, without overstating the likelihood of these risks materializing, and while also acknowledging the non-absolute effectiveness of available protections.

We propose a framework with criteria for data sharing policies for funding bodies, scientists, research consortia and biorepositories. Such policy should:

1.	Be consistent with participant consent and conform to applicable laws and ethics. Within the consent process the limitations of data protection measures should be disclosed.

2.	Establish conditions for releasing data that include a binding, enforceable commitment by researchers and data custodians to not share such data with unauthorized third parties and not to use the data alone or in combination with other data sets to either attempt or create the conditions for the re-identification of an individual participant. To that end, oversight mechanisms should be established. 

3.	Manage data associated with a given hPSC line (e.g. genomic, epigenomic, phenotypic, and demographic where available) based on a proportional assessment of the risks of individual identifiability, tailored to the nature of cell line derivation (e.g. hESC vs. iPSCs). 

A cautious approach should be taken when sharing raw sequence reads (e.g. whole genomes and full exomes), short tandem repeats (STR), SNP or other identity profiles, given that they can include sensitive or personal information that is directly identifiable or would facilitate re-identification of otherwise de-identified data However, research laboratories should be encouraged to share STR profiles of cell lines with bona fide researchers and biorepositories. Identity data (e.g. STR, SNP, etc.) should be shared in strict confidence and solely for the purposes of confirming cell line identity for quality control purposes and resolving cases of cell line cross-contamination.

4.	Stipulate appropriate sanctions for any breach by those authorized to handle the data.

5.	In conformity with recommendation # 3 above, make available sensitive or personal data associated with a hPSC line  only to bona fide researchers  who have  provided a protocol that is:

a.	Consistent with widely recognized good research practice and with applicable legal and ethical requirements;
b.	Aimed at generating new knowledge and understanding using rigorous scientific methods; and
c.	Intended for publishing and sharing research findings with the scientific community without undue restrictions, and
d.	Reviewed by an independent oversight entity. 

As the field of hPSC research evolves and with changes in the potential re-identifiability of participants, data stewards should: 
a)	Make appropriate adjustments to their data sharing arrangements in line with the considerations above, and
b)	Avail themselves of research on the concerns of hPSC participants and use such information to guide their data sharing practices. 

There are no methods or governance mechanisms that can ensure the absolute protection of participant identity (Rodriguez et. al., 2013; Kaye, 2012). Currently, participant re-identification is rare. A proportionate approach to privacy in this context of data sharing should be construed based on reasonably foreseeable risks thereby distinguishing between perceived and real risks. Such an approach should not rely on worst case or hypothetical scenarios, nor should it relate to situations in which the possibility of identifiability remains negligible (Knoppers, 2010).  Most importantly, it should be subject to ongoing re-assessment to reflect evolving scientific and IT advances as well as changing public attitudes (which sometimes react to hypothetical scenarios) (Dasgupta et. al., 2014).  Proportionate criteria for determining what risks are real or which are remote for identifiability are needed to avoid unnecessarily over-expanding privacy regulations that could hinder scientific progress. Moreover, in drafting such criteria, we should question whether in information-rich societies, the goal of complete de-identifiability to avoid privacy-related risks is a realistic or laudable goal (Knoppers, 2010).  No amount of legal protection or ethical safeguards can eliminate such risks. Enforceable sanctions (e.g. withholding /terminating actual/future funding or participation in research projects, disclosing misconduct to other funding bodies or stakeholders) against those who misuse data are a more realistic and useful legal tool.  Furthermore, the use of a more transparent terminology, such as “coded”, that does not refer to “de-identified” cell lines and data -- but instead acknowledges the small but potential risk of re-identification -- may serve to provide potential participants with a more accurate basis for making informed decisions about whether to assume these risks and permit their cells and data to be used in research.  
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